Having outlined a model of analysis, the essay will now construct on this model by sing the terminological issues contained within the inquiry. While revisiting the nomenclature in the essay inquiry, legalistic mechanisms are the Torahs, executive orders and other legal instruments that set the land regulations for governmental and non-governmental activities ( UN/ISDR, 2005, p. 6 ) . These mechanisms can be either adhering, or non-binding ( OCHA, 2009 ) . Laws, executive orders and other legal instruments all autumn in the class of adhering mechanisms, ( UN/ISDR, 2005, p. 6 ) , whereas non-binding mechanisms comprise of appropriate institutional models that are needed to transport out policies and legislative steps. These include organisations or establishments such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA ) ( Esworthy, 2012, p. 6 ) , with a recognized function to play in catastrophe hazard direction.
In the visible radiation of the definition of legalistic mechanisms as elaborated in the old paragraph, a clear differentiation between ‘company ‘ and ‘corporation ‘ shall now be explained. It is argued that a company or corporation is a creative activity of the jurisprudence, and hence exists as a ‘corporate individual ‘ with such entitlements as having belongings, Sue and be sued, and negotiate contracts. The legal mechanism employed in giving a legal being to a company stems from the fact that two or more persons can come together, and by virtuousness of their action of set uping a company, they are perceived as holding brought forth a new individual in jurisprudence ( Ochich, 2008 ) .
The apprehension as outlined in the acknowledgment of companies or corporations as ‘legal individuals ‘ therefore nowadayss such entities with the proviso of being held apt for the Acts of the Apostless or skips of themselves, or their representatives. The pattern in the early common jurisprudence presented corporations as entities that could non be reprehensively prosecuted under the jurisprudence as separate entities ( Storm, Undated ) for such offenses that require personal engagement such as burglary, buggery, bigamy, colza, incest, assault, slaying and lese majesty ( Ochich, 2008 ) . However, new theoretical accounts have been explored over clip in order to flexibly use corporate liability to the corporations. These theoretical accounts have been peculiarly applicable in the United States under the EPA where a flexible and adaptable enforcement mechanism for corporate liability is in topographic point ( Esworthy, 2012 ) .
The rise of corporate liability topic coincided with the rise of public consciousness in naming for rigorous legal mechanisms to safeguard the safety of the workers, and by extension the environment in which the corporate entities were pulling the resources. This was grounds by corporate organic structures transforming their civilization in response to consumer demands and to follow with the bing legal mechanism. Over clip, this transmutation became the portion of the organisation, thereby giving rise to safety as a civilization as reflected in single and group values, attitudes, competencies and forms of behavior that determine the committedness to, and manner and proficiency of, an organizationi??s wellness and safety programmes ( Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, pp. Unit 6: 6-12 ) .
Having considered the nomenclatures contained within the inquiry and their wide application in corporate entities, the essay will broaden the apprehension of these nomenclatures by profiling two instances affecting corporate liability, with the primary focal point of happening a convergence between legal mechanisms and organisational safety.
Texas City Oil Refinery Fire and Explosion – Texas
On March 23, 2005, the BP Texas City refinery experienced a ruinous procedure accident. The refinery, a 19.3-million-gallon-a-day installation in Texas City, Texas, exploded, killing 15 workers and wounding more than 170, during the restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerisation unit ( British Petroleum, 2005, pp. 7-14 ) . Following the detonation, the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel issued 10 safety recommendations ( BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, 2007 ) , including naming on BP ‘s corporate board to closely supervise safety public presentation at its installations ( CSB, 2007a ) . Federal research workers from the Occupational Safety & A ; Health Administration ( OSHA ) , an bureau of the United States Department of Labor discovered more than 300 safety misdemeanors ( CSB, 2007b, p. 200 ) at the installation and fined BP $ 21.3 million ( Chappell, 2005 ) . The CSB attributed the catastrophe to unadvised cost-cutting that skimped on care. BP finally accepted duty to condemnable misdemeanors of the Clean Air Act and paid $ 50 million in condemnable mulcts. In October 2009, OSHA once more fined BP for 709 misdemeanors at the same Texas works, including many of the same misdemeanors that caused the fatal 2005 detonation. This clip the mulct was $ 87.7 million ( OSHA, Undated ) .
Deepwater Horizon Blowout and Oil Spill – Gulf of Mexico
On April 20, 2010, a gas release and subsequent detonation occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig working on the Macondo geographic expedition good in the Gulf of Mexico ( British Petroleum, 2010 ) . There were 126 workers on board, 11 out of which were killed, and 17 were injured ( National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. 57 ) . The rig burned for 36 hours ( British Petroleum, 2010, p. 9 ) until it sank on April 22, 2010 ( National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. 57 ) . In the 87 yearss that followed, 10s of 1000s of workers engaged in on- and off-shore containment and clean-up activities ( Department of Health and Human Services, 2011, p. 4 ) . Assorted schemes were used by BP and authorities functionaries to crest the and by July 15, 2010 when the well was capped, about five million barrels of oil ( 205.8 million gallons ) had spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. Federal scientific discipline and technology squads revised their estimations on the rate of oil flow several times, and concluded that between April 20 and July 15, 53,000-62,000 barrels per twenty-four hours spilled into the Gulf ( Robertson & A ; Kraus, 2010 ) . This was to be the largest homo, economic, and environmental oil spill catastrophe in U.S history. The Presidential Panel ( Office of the Press Secretary, 2010 ) labeled the spill preventable, caused by a series of failures and bloopers by the companies involved in boring the well, and the authorities regulators assigned to patrol them ( National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011 ) .
This essay shall now utilize the two instances to research the statement that legalistic mechanisms are effectual in advancing organisational safety, and analyze the theories that make organisations or legal mechanisms effectual – or inadequate.
Following the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and possibly informed by old incidents of a similar nature, a bustle of cases were filed by attorneies on behalf of commercial fishermen, shrimpers and injured workers against BP, Transocean, Cameron and other companies involved in the boring procedure ( The New York Times, 2012 ) . In expectancy of immense mulcts that were to come as a consequence of the cases, BP begun allocating fiscal liability to its spouses and contractors. For case, Anadarko Petroleum agreed to pay $ 4 billion, Cameron International agreed to pay $ 250 million and Moex Offshore agreed to pay $ 90 million to federal and province authoritiess, including $ 70 million in civil punishments. This cagey manoeuvre can be explained in the visible radiation of old oil spills and oil-related catastrophes in which BP had learnt as a company on different schemes of pull offing fiscal liability. In guaranting fiscal safety, BP had pegged its production on the public presentation by its contractors assigned on each installation. BP linked the public presentation to liability in the event of loss and carelessness, which was restricted to the plus itself, and non on the broader web on BP-owned assets and installations in the Gulf of Mexico or Texas. BP besides presumptively insured its concern involvements, as reflected in the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon oil spill, whereby insurance premiums rose by every bit much as 15 to 25 per centum in shallow Waterss and up to 50 per centum for deepwater rigs ( National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. 245 ) . As such, BP was able to ‘disperse ‘ liability to insurance companies, spouses and contractors.
A company can easy be belly-up if faced with such prodigious sums of mulcts. However, BP was able to stay in concern in the period before and after the two catastrophes:
BP reported a loss before involvement and revenue enhancements of $ 3.7 billion, about one-sixth of its 2009 net income of $ 26.4 billion. In the most recent one-fourth ( 2012 ) , BP reported gross revenues of $ 93 billion and a net income of $ 5.5 billion ( Tobik, 2012 ) .
This brings into inquiry the effectivity of mulcts as a agency of implementing corporate liability. The 2010 spill had already cost BP $ 38 billion in charges, including an extra $ 847 million in the 2nd one-fourth of 2012, and even threatened its being at one point ( The New York Times, 2012 ) . Given the experience that BP had in covering with such sort of judicial proceedings, the Nov. 15, 2012 colony ( Lustgarten A. , BP Agrees to Plead Guilty to Crimes in Gulf Oil Spill, 2012b ) indispensable removed all the possibilities of farther felon charges. The colony presented the restricted nature of mulcts as a legalistic mechanisms used by the EPA. The lone other potency for increasing the mulcts against BP is on the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, to which BP had already started raising financess by selling some of its assets in the Gulf of Mexico ( Reed, 2012 ) . The insufficiency of mulcts as an enforcement tool is that there is a legal lower limit and maximal bound as set by the statues. For case, under the Clean Water Act, the mulcts are limited to $ 1,100 to $ 4,300 for each barrel spilled ( National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. 211 ) . It can be argued that mulcts can run out the resources that an organisation, such as BP, can put in bettering safety. However, a given sheer sum of one-year net incomes that BP makes from oil production, such mulcts to look lenient and a mere ‘slap on the carpus ‘ ( Lustgarten A. , 2012c ) . Sing the easiness at which a concern giant such as BP has handled the fiscal punishments associated with the 2005 Texas Oil Refinery Explosion and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, it is possible to reason that the mulcts authorized by the legislative act are grossly unequal and undermine any deterrent consequence of the enforcement commissariats. Organizations with multi-billion dollar net income volumes have had a inclination of handling such fiddling amounts simply as a concern cost ( Center for Progressive Reform, 2010, p. 19 ) .
Fines are non the lone method employed by regulative organic structures. The EPA uses advanced schemes and tools to place and rectify non-compliance, reconstruct environmental harm, and enforce punishments intended to discourage future misdemeanors ( Esworthy, 2012, p. 18 ) . This continuum of response mechanisms ranges from conformity aid, conformity inducements, and monitoring and enforcement ( EPA, 2011a ) . This scope of tools escalate in footings of their degree of badness and strength thereby giving first-time wrongdoers better flexibleness to alter and follow, while enforcing heavy punishments to reiterate wrongdoers. BP had a hapless record in footings of misdemeanors, mulcts and catastrophes associated with the company. In the period taking to the 2005 Texas Refinery Explosion, the regulative organic structures had tried to utilize other less punitory regulative tools against BP such as warnings, monitoring, and reviews. The forbearance of the regulative organic structures was however tested and stretched ( Lustgarten A. , 2012c ) by BP ‘s perennial civilization of utilizing mulcts as a manner of settling liabilities. The other option that regulative organic structures may hold to utilize is debarment. Debarment is a government-wide legal mechanism that which when imposed by a Federal bureau prevents a corporate entity persons from take parting in authorities contracts, subcontracts, loans, grants and other aid plans ( EPA, 2011b ) . BP is no alien to debarment. In old catastrophes, including the 2006 oil leak in Alaska, BP was able to avoid debarment by pleading guilty to felony charges and subscribing a colony holding to five old ages of probation and promising to establish a i??revised corporate attitude.i?? ( Lustgarten & A ; Knutson, 2010 ) . The wake of the Deepwater Horizon Oil spill presented a similar form of settling liability. Debarment is however non an easy option for the Federal governments to take because of BP ‘s of import place to US economic system. For case, BP paid the federal authorities more than $ 674 million in royalties in 2009 for its authorities rentals, and it provides about 12 per centum of the U.S. militaryi??s fuel supply ( Lustgarten A. , 2010 ) . Harmonizing to POGO ( Project on Government Oversight ) , a undertaking that maintains a database of contractors that have been cited for misconduct, BP accounts for 63 misdemeanors, but besides has $ 1033.3m in Federal contracts in FY 2010 ( POJO, 2012 ) . Harmonizing to the White House, the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee ( ISDC ) , increased suspensions and debarments of companies that failed to play by the regulations rose from 1900 in FY 2009 to more than 3000 in FY 2011 ( Joe Jordan, 2012 ) . However, with BP still in concern and acquiring authorities contracts, it is hard to anticipate how effectual debarment is, as a legal mechanism, to big transnational corporations such as BP.
Since the enforcement mechanisms do non look to hold the desired hindrance consequence on BP, what are the alternate agencies through which BP can continue organisational safety? In the definition of nomenclatures, it was noted that the safety of an organisation is intertwined with its civilization. One of the visions of Sir John Browne was to transform BP into a high-reliability organisation, non merely in concern but besides in safety of its workers and the environment. BP ‘s organisational civilization however portrayed a different image. This essay shall analyze this statement through the comparing of a different high-reliability constitution i.e. a US Navy aircraft bearer. The exposure to hazard and rough elements on boring platform operations are comparable to those on an aircraft bearer. However, citing University of Michigan professors Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe, William M. Duke, the Director of Learning and Development for Afterburner Inc argues that:
U.S. Navy aircraft bearer flight operations demonstrate somewhat less than 3 human deaths per 100,000 flight hours in malice of operating in an highly hostile, complex, and constantly-changing environment where the mean age of the work force is merely 21 old ages ( Duke, 2010 ) .
For Sir John Browne, the primary focal point of bettering systems meant that BP adapted to engineering for accomplishing its concern aims. Geo-political alterations in the oil industry had forced BP and other transnational oil companies to seek oil in some of the topographic points one time presumed to be hard to entree ( Lustgarten A. , 2012a ) . Nevertheless, engineering had made it possible for BP to be able to bore and pull out oil in the deep Waterss of the Gulf of Mexico, where the end product would counterbalance for the invested engineering. However, merely like the complexness presented by an aircraft bearer, the operation of an oil rig as a ‘stand-alone complex system ‘ could hold encouraged BP to concentrate on the overall civilization, particularly on the workers that interact with the system on a daily footing. One of the transmutations in the Horton-Browne epoch for BP was the decentalisation of decision-making. BP in the late eightiess had been a bureaucratic organisation, which comprised several beds of direction in a matrix construction. In some instances, simple proposal alterations required 15 signatures ( Locke et al. , 2011, p. 4 ) . However, after denationalization by the so Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and decentalisation of decision-making by Robert Horton ( BP ‘s Chief executive officer from 1989 ) , BP had more flexibleness in decision-making that besides coupled with taking hazards in concern ventures and cut downing costs. Horton ‘s bequest in the organisational construction of BP meant that employees were encouraged to take duty and exercising decision-making enterprise at all degrees ( Ibid ) . This bequest precipitated to David Simon ( BP ‘s Chief executive officer from 1992 ) and Sir John Browne ( BP ‘s Chief executive officer from 1995 ) , both of whom expanded decentralized decision-making authorization and duty for run intoing public presentation marks to undertake onsite plus directors. The culminated in each installation runing as a ‘stand-alone complex system ‘ which meant that the cognition, information, and decision-making was based on the available information at-hand at the installation, and with the workers. As Sir John Browne noted, BP had no option but to acquire its bequest sorted out, get faster on its pess, do more trades, and go more advanced ” . ( Lustgarten A. , 2012a, p. 36 ) . Onsite directors in bend precipitated the stand-alone complex system manner of operation and decision-making to the employees that were working on the site. This organisational theoretical account had its advantages with directors independently taking determination onsite. However, the downside of this theoretical account was the ingraining of a civilization that encouraged via media on safety in order to run into public presentation marks as reported by a 2004 enquiry ( Lustgarten & A ; Knutson, 2010 ) . The same independent civilization failed to promote larning from incidents and best patterns between directors and workers from different assets, even though they were working in the same industry ( oil ) and the same organisation ( BP ) . As a complex organisation, BP ‘s civilization of acquisition could hold benefitted from system-wide experiences in an isomorphous theoretical account ( Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, pp. Unit 1: 1-11 ) . It can be argued that so the Texas Refinery Explosion or the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill could hold been prevented if the direction in BP hierarchy would hold emphasized on corporate heedfulness, watchfulness, and a learning civilization. However, onsite directors had small inducement to portion best patterns on hazard direction from the assorted BP geographic expedition and production sites, and past events in the industry from other companies. As noted by Jeanne Pascal, a calling EPA lawyer ( retired ) in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, “ they merely do n’t larn ” ( Lustgarten A. , 2012a, p. 16 ) . The two catastrophes, and so the old incidents affecting BP had one latent form that was manifested in the inability of the organisation involved to efficaciously synthesise and portion the information from separate i??precursori?? incidents with the relevant people across the organisation so that appropriate action could be taken to cut down the hazard of catastrophe ( Cookea & A ; Rohledera, 2006 ) .
Pulling from the studies on the Texas Refinery Explosion and Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, it is possible to speculate that the way taken by BP was an effort to hold a high-reliability proficient system on the rigs and refineries that were being operated in a ‘garbage can ‘ organisational theoretical account ( Cohen, March, & A ; Olsen, 1972 ) . The studies established in the wake of the catastrophes that BP used to run in debatable and ill-informed determinations on worker safety ( National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011 ) . This was reflected in the many commendations received by BP for misdemeanors from OSHA. The bullying of the workers and the force per unit area to accomplish public presentation marks made it apparently hard for the workers to supply nonsubjective information that could hold been critical in decision-making for onsite directors. The workers alternatively provided statements that they knew would be pleasant to the directors, even when it meant that the safety of the complex system, and their ain safety would be compromised. Therefore BP ‘s organisational civilization placed it in a place where it was blameworthy to its ain decision-making thereby taking to the catastrophes by neglecting to link the complex proficient and societal systems ( Cookea & A ; Rohledera, 2006 ) . During the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the failure of the runaway preventer, good design, and a faulty cement occupation constituted the proficient failure, whereas the mistakes of judgement by boring directors and crew members presented the societal failure. Using Turner ‘s systems approach theory on the catastrophe presents an statement that BP ‘s civilization of disregarding the warning marks and accommodating escapist liability steps such as fiscal payouts served to incubate the mistakes in the systems to the extent that it led to ruinous events. Incubation was besides apparent in the regulative bureaus. The insufficiency of regulative organic structures and enforcement mechanisms, coupled with the ability of big transnational corporate entities to go on runing served to do such ruinous events ineluctable. BP ‘s blameworthy failure in the visible radiation of liability was its inability to anticipate and forestall the Texas Explosion and the Deepwater Oil Spill. This was coupled with BP ‘s system failure to pay attending to warning marks and institute steps to rectify the jobs.
It is hard to pull a decision on whether the proficient systems failed, or the complex societal systems led to the catastrophes in Texas City and the Gulf of Mexico. What is of import as in the concluding statements is that the catastrophes should function as a mention point for the oil industry to larn and for BP to re-examine its corporate safety civilization. BP remains a cardinal participant in the United States concern environment. Therefore, BP is likely to go on with its concern involvements in the US. The vision of the old CEOs in transforming the proficient and fiscal qualities of BP has been seeable. However, these transmutations have besides come with ruinous events that have dented the corporate safety image of BP. It is hence of import that the following coevals of CEO to put on attempts to transform the safety civilization within the corporate giant. As summed up by the presidential panel that investigated the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, i??Complex Systems Almost Always Fail in Complex Waysi?? .