Inward warfare for the foreseeable future.[4]? By

Security Threats to Pakistan


Pakistan is tormented
by a huge number of inward dangers, the most noteworthy of which are an
assorted cluster of psychological militant associations and, to a lesser
degree, sorted out wrongdoing. Shockingly, the Pakistani government has just a
constrained authorization ability to manage these difficulties.1
Pakistan’s military, paramilitary, and police powers have been more than once
activated to battle insurgences and local turmoil. These contentions are
regularly ethnically based or partisan. Some include culprits. The security
powers have likewise been occupied with putting down common agitation,
including uproars and shows. The security powers mounted two counterinsurgency
battles against Pashtun civilian armies in 1947– 1958 and in 1973. Pakistan is
as of now fighting Pashtun activists in FATA and parts of the settled Pashtun
Pakistan’s military officers and senior security authorities don’t see all
types of militancy as essential dangers to the state. They keep on abetting
militancy in a few structures, to a great extent since they see aggressors as
potential resources in their opposition with India and different nations in the
locale. While Baluch activists and the Pakistani Taliban in FATA and Swat are
viewed as a danger, other aggressor bunches acting in and from Pakistan are
disregarded or even appreciate bolster from the military or the knowledge
administrations. Regardless of whether the state made plans to act against
these activists, it might not have the ability to do as such successfully.
While the Pakistani open overwhelmingly trusts that numerous aggressor bunches
are dangers to Pakistan’s security, some vital open gatherings bolster some of
these activist gatherings and their objectives.3
With regards to this developing danger, Pakistan was being considered as the epicentre
of worldwide psychological warfare for the foreseeable future.4?
By and huge, the quantity of extremist gatherings in Pakistan took off to 60
aggressor outfits.5
The vast majority of these agitators endeavored to topple the Pakistan
government as well as try to be a piece of worldwide Jihad.6
Executive General (DG), Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) General Asim
Bajwa contends that, Insurgency on the western front is a reality and is a
piece of a risk grid looked by our country.7?
In this key change in perspective, Pakistan Army thought about the inward clash
on the western front as a war of survival.8
Additionally, the sustenance of rebellion isn’t conceivable without the outer
money related and ideological help. As per DG ISPR, General Bajwa, India is the
principle supporter of psychological warfare and rebellion in Pakistan,
particularly in FATA area, asserting that prohibited outfits couldn’t work on
such a major scale without remote financing and help.9

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Counterterrorism Strategy


In spite of the fact
that the US-drove military crusade in Afghanistan in October 2001 removed the
Taliban administration, it extended the danger well into Pakistan. The greater
part of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban pioneers and unit slipped into Pakistan’s
inborn regions, flanking Afghanistan. At first, they had packed in South
Waziristan and afterward extended their help base in alternate zones of the
FATA. By 2003, a free collusion of innate aggressor gatherings, called
themselves as the Pakistani Taliban, under the initiative of Nek Mohammad
Wazir, had started to rise in South Waziristan. It soon settled connections
with other Pakistan-based aggressor partisan outfits, the Afghan Taliban and
Al-Qaeda, and propelled guerrilla operations not just against yet in addition
the security powers and the general population of Pakistan in the ancestral
territories and also the settled regions and huge urban areas.10
To battle threat of psychological warfare Pakistan require a powerful
counterterrorism system. In the event of Pakistan’s counterterrorism system, it
has so far utilized both the military and non-military alternatives to manage
the danger of fear mongering. The military choices incorporated the graceless
security operations against activists in the inborn territories, and the low
force quick operations in the settled zones, especially in the real urban areas
to capture different pioneers of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. What’s more,
non-military alternatives include both engagement and administrative angles. As
of engagement arrangement, Pakistan marked different peace manages activists.
Under authoritative viewpoints, distinctive governments in Pakistan since 9/11
have presented different against psychological warfare enactments as different
presidential acts and parliamentary laws and restricted aggressor bunches in
different stages.11




Since 9/11 Pakistan has
led more than 1087 military operations, including 323 noteworthy and 766 minor
operations40 against the Pakistani Taliban. A portion of the fantastic scale
operations are as under:12


•           Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–
2002),Operation Al Mizan (The Equilibrium) (2002– 2006), Operation Zalzala
(Earthquake) (2008), Operation Tri-Star (2008), Operation Black Thunderstorm
locale (2009), Operation SherDil ( Lion’s Heart) (2008), Operations Rah-e-Haq
(The Path of Faith) 1, II and III (2007-2009), Operation Raah-e-Raast (The
Righteous Path) (2009), Operation Brekhna (Light) I and II (2009), Operation
Raah-e-Nijat (Path of Redemption ) (2009– 2010),Operation Koh-e-suffaid (The
White Mountain) (2011), Operations Khyber-1, Khyber II, (2014-2015), Operation
Zarb-e-Azb (The Sharpening blow of The Sword of Prophet-Mohammad (PBUH)


By and large, these
Military operations have undermined the will and the operational capacity of
the guerillas by annihilating their physical foundation. The primary
significant operation by Pakistan military against the activists in Pakistan
was Operation Al-Mizan from 2002-2006.The troopers conveyed for this operation
in FATA were around 70,000-80,000. At present, the conveyed drive has been
expanded to around 170,000 fighters in entire of FATA and KP43. Kanwal refers
to the figure to be 150,000 troops.44 Operation Al-Mizan contained a few
littler operations, for example, Operation Kalosha II. Later on, Operation
Zalzala and operation Tri-Star were propelled in South Waziristan Agency in
January 2008 against Baitullah Mehsud and his supporters. In April 2009,
Operation Black Thunderstorm was propelled in Swat, Mingora, Buner, Shangla and
lower Dir, which stayed under substantial impact of Taliban and proceeded till
June 2009 with the plan to retake the Taliban controlled territories. In Bajaur
Agency, Operation Sher Dil was begun in August 2008 and proceeded till February
2009. On July 4, 2011, Pakistan Army propelled Koh-e-Sufaid in focal and bring
down Kurram Agency against the partisan militancy.


Thus, Operation Brekhna
I and II were propelled in Mohamand Agency in 2009 against the TTP aggressors.
Furthermore, Operation Raah-e-Nijat was completed on June 19, 2009, against the
Mehsud group of the Pakistani Taliban in FATA?s South Waziristan organization. Armed
force cleared the region from the activist ownership in four to five months.
Correspondingly, Operation Raah-e-Raast was completed on May 11, 2009 against
the Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat in KP?s Malakand Division. In four months, military
reestablished the writ of the state in Swat locale and the bordering region.


Operation Zarb-e-Azb
was propelled on June 15, 2014 against nearby and remote aggressors in FATA?s
North Waziristan Agency (NWA). The operation was propelled after the fizzled
peace talks amongst Taliban and government. Pakistan Army cleared NWA from
militants? nearness alongside devastating Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
industrial facilities and militants? summon and control structure. Then,
Operation Khyber-1 was propelled on October 17, 2014, against the aggressor
gathering, Lashkar-I-Islam in Khyber Agency.


The philosophy of
Operation Zarb-e-Azb is pretty much like the Operation Black Thunderstorm,
Operation Raah-e-Raast and Operation Sher Dil. In every one of these
operations, elevated help started things out took after by the progression of
ground troops. This helped the ground powers to move in the region with power
and viability. Local people were emptied from the zone, after which the Army
shelled Taliban positions utilizing substantial big guns, planes and
helicopters. In the wake of softening their positions, the military moved in
with ground powers. DG ISPR, Major General Asim Bajwa stated51 that
“Operation Zarb-e-Azb is the greatest and most all around facilitated
operation at any point led against fear mongers” and it is considered as a
„war of survival?. In any case, among all the real operations, Operation
Raah-e-Raast was the best operation to date against activists as in it
adequately expelled them from Swat, guaranteeing the arrival of dislodged
individuals back to their homes.13
Other than military operations in the ancestral regions, Pakistan’s insight
offices with the assistance of Rangers and Police likewise did different quick
manhunt operations in significant urban areas of Pakistan to secure the
authority of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, despite the fact that their best
initiative has never been caught.14
Other than the utilization of power through propelling military operations
against the activists, different Pakistani governments additionally attempted
non-military alternatives with a specific end goal to check psychological
warfare in the nation.15


military personnel approach


CI at the center is in
a general sense a war of thoughts.16
As there are no silver projectiles for countering the rebellion, in 2009,
Pakistan perceived the certainty of consolidating the dynamic and non-motor
allots to work a more adaptable and creative CI approach.17
From that point forward, the non military personnel and the political
government rendered the key course and introduction for the viable execution of
CI battle.18


Pakistan’s first
de-radicalisation program was propelled in September 2009, after fruition of
operation Raah-e-Raast (The Righteous Path) against Pakistani Taliban in Swat.
The majority of the activists found amid the operation were adolescents who
were prepared as suicide planes. A need was felt to present an extremist
recovery program. Regular folks with participation of Army run six primary
de-radicalisation programs all through the nation: in particular, Sabaoon
(Morning Light), Mashaal (Candle, Lamp), Rastoon (Returning Back), Sparlay
(Spring), Nawa-e-Sahar (New Morning, New Beginning) and Heila (Hope). The Swat
de-radicalisation program involves Sabaoon for the aggressors (12-18 years),
Rastoon ( 19-25 years) and Mishal focuses (for the group of activists to make
mindfulness about care and checking the restored people). The program is go
through private-open association. A delegate assemblage of nearby thoughtful
society and non-administrative association, Hum Pakistan Foundation is
basically in charge of dealing with the issues of the biggest recovery focus
(Sabaoon). Since 2009, Sabaoon has restored around 200 activists, while the
Rastoon has restored 1196 aggressors. Rest of other de-radicalisation focuses
are working on a moderately little scale.


A comparative
de-radicalisation program was propelled in Punjab and is planned and displayed
on the example of Swat’s Sabaoon focus. It began by consolidating 350
aggressors in the principal stage with an end goal to de-radicalize the
de-followed and mentally programmed youth. The program depends on impacting
ideological convictions and behavioral adjustment design. The Punjab recovery
program concentrated on ex-activists of gatherings like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT,
Army of the Pure), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM, Muhammad’s Army) and hostile to Shia
aggressor gatherings, for example, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ, Army of Jhangvi) and
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The program was composed on a multi-pronged
methodology of counteractive action, restoration and after-mind. It had three
modules: mental appraisal, religious recovery and professional preparing. Three
groups of around 311 members finished the preparation.


Madrassas and mosques
are the fundamental voting public of religio-political gatherings, some of
these, with radicalized foundation and partisan activist associations. The
general discernment is that the partisan associations and religio-political
gatherings control by utilizing the device of madrassas for their own
advantages. A portion of the madrassas, apparently, are accepting assets from
nations in the Middle East through unlawful means. It is critical to reduce the
tax evasion and unlawful stream of cash. In 2008, President Pervez Musharraf
presented the Madrassa Regulation Ordinance. He construct it in light of the
2002 Ordinance to bring madrassas under control and state supervision. The
reason to enroll madrassas with the administration was to present an
educational programs, which does not lecture militancy, despise discourse and
sectarianism. In 2010, Pakistan People’s Party-driven coalition government
consented to an arrangement with the Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan
(ITMP), an umbrella association of madrassas oversight boards.35 The
understanding conveyed arrangements to perceive the five ITMP madrassas sheets
and connection them to the Ministry of Education through an Act of Parliament.
Consequently, the assention denied madrassas from distributing writing that advances
militancy or sectarianism and educate a more comprehensive educational
programs. Nonetheless, the understanding couldn’t be introduced to the
Parliament for enactment because of bureaucratic bottlenecks. The madrassas
enrollment and bringing them under the immediate control of government
organizations is a trial of the state’s take steps to defeat the test of
radicalisation and religious fanaticism.


Pakistan’s National
Assembly passed the counter fear Pakistan Protection Bill in July 2014. The bill
rendered the Pakistani security powers with extra powers to battle
psychological warfare. It enabled Pakistani security powers with extra powers;
to capture suspects and hunt houses without court orders. A few common society
and human rights associations expect that such a broad assortment of-law will
transform Pakistan into a police state. Pakistan’s history is loaded with
illustrations where such laws have been manhandled to exploit the rivals. In
this way, there is a dread that, later on, the experts can utilize this bill
for their own vested purposes too. In any case, the circumstance, being
additional standard, requests additional normal cures. This is the reason the
bill has been ordered as an extraordinary arrangement of laws for a long time.


National Counter
Terrorism Authority (NACTA) set up in 2009, is the focal organization to
arrange and actualize CI operations in Pakistan’s troublesome political
culture. Under the support of NACTA, Pakistan’s CI includes the achievement of
military and regular citizen goals as cherished in the National Internal
Security Policy (NISP) and National Action Plan (NAP), which qualified as
Pakistan’s doctrinal and key manuals. NISP was planned by NACTA to outline a
doctrinal and vital structure to battle the revolt and psychological warfare;
it depended on the possibility of joining of every single national exertion and
included three components exchange, seclusion and prevention. In the
arrangement of security reorganization techniques, NACTA advanced five levels of
National Security Strategy in 2013 to destroy, contain, avert, instruct and
reintegrate. Be that as it may, the most vital turning point in Pakistan CI
general doctrinal approach was NAP, which was laid in 2014, and re-verbalized
the substance of NISP. While keeping supervision on the advance of NAP, the
head of NACTA, Ghani contends that instruction changes are missing from NAP
targets and needs. Our training framework isn’t sufficiently strong to suit the
2.2 million understudies of Madrassas. Additionally, 35 thousand madrassas
can’t be closed down the nation over. What’s more, there are different
territories where strong activities and exhaustive arranging is required: in
the wide area of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE), FATA changes, criminal Justice
framework, building national counters account and Madrassas changes.19


1 Seth
G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal andJames
Dobbins,.” Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance
toRepressive and Transitioning Regimes.” Pakistan,126-7, RAND Corporation.

2 According
to Zahid Hussain (2007, p. 120), “It was a bloody 18-month fight and the
officers never hoped to repeat it.”

3 Fair,
Ramsay, and Kull, 2008

4 David
Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, (London, Hurst &Co Publishers (Ltd),

5 Pakistan
Armed Forces, “List of 60 Terrorist Organizations declared terrorists by
Government of Pakistan,” April 26, 2016, Pakistan Defence News blog,

6 Ahmed
Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and West
(New York, Penguin Group (USA), 2012):139,155.

7   “New doctrine: Army identifies „home grown
militancy? as biggest threat,” Express Tribune, Pakistan, January 3, 2013

8   Amir Mir, “The News, Pakistan Army must
acquire a TV channel,” December 16, 2013: Also see “New doctrine: Army
identifies home grown militancy as biggest threat,” Express Tribune, January 3,

9 “India
playing with fire by funding Taliban, says Pak Army”, February 12, 2015,
Pakistan Today,
(accessed on 13 March 2015).

10 Naeem
Ahmed, Pakistan’s Counterterrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic,
regional and international security, FMSH-WP-2014-59, January 2014,6/23.

11 Ibid,7/23

12 Interview
of Colonel Nadeem Anwar, Deputy Director Inter Services Public Relations, and
Headquarters 11 Corps Peshawar on June 17, 2015. Also See Kashif Abbasi,
“Chronology of military operations, June 16, 2014, Also see Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair,
2010, „Counterinsurgency in Pakistan?, RAND Corporation, Santa Moniaca.

13 Shahid
Ahmad Afridi , ” Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency: Military and Civilian Approach”,
Strategic Studies,vol-36,No:3,2016.

14 Naeem
Ahmed, Pakistan’s Counterterrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic,
regional and international security, FMSH-WP-2014-59, January 2014.p-10.

15 Ibid

16 Tariq
Pervez, “Challenges of establishing a rehabilitation program in Pakistan,”
Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to
Counter-terrorism, ed., Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jeral and Lawrence Rubin, (New
York: Routledge, 2011): 122

17 “The
challenges of counter radicalisation in Pakistan,” United States Institute of
Peace, May 9, 2012,

18 Shahid
Ahmad Afridi , ” Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency: Military and Civilian Approach”,
Strategic Studies,vol-36,No:3,2016.

19 Ibid,